Kids rescued while terrorists keep their jobs
Security forces rescue 45 abductees in Oyo, troops arrest a Moroccan ISIS operative, and soldiers' pay rises to ₦100,000.
Nigeria’s security efforts intensified last Friday when security forces rescued 45 abducted students and teachers in Oyo State and arrested eight suspected kidnappers. Later that same day, the House of Representatives called for an end to the rehabilitation of repentant terrorists and stronger action against ransom payments. Meanwhile, Defence Minister Christopher Musa also announced that soldiers’ minimum monthly salary had increased to ₦100,000 and advocated the death penalty for kidnappers, while President Bola Tinubu met security chiefs to review operations. And earlier this week, troops arrested a suspected Moroccan ISIS operative in Borno after repelling an ISWAP attack and recovering intelligence materials suggesting foreign support for the group.
Nigeria’s latest security developments expose a deeper contradiction at the heart of the country’s counterterrorism strategy. On one hand, security forces continue to record tactical successes, repelling ISWAP attacks in the Northeast, rescuing kidnapped schoolchildren in the Southwest, and uncovering evidence of foreign terrorist facilitators operating within insurgent networks. On the other hand, the broader strategic picture remains troubling: insurgent groups continue to generate enormous financial resources through kidnapping, foreign extremist networks remain embedded in Nigeria’s conflict zones, and the state still struggles to adequately resource the personnel expected to confront these threats. The result is a security architecture that wins isolated battles while remaining under pressure in the wider war.
Step into this, the House of Representatives’ call to end the rehabilitation of repentant terrorists under Operation Safe Corridor, which reflects growing public frustration with a programme that many believe has failed to inspire confidence among communities most affected by insurgency. Since 2016, thousands of former combatants have passed through deradicalisation and reintegration programmes, yet attacks by Boko Haram, ISWAP and bandit groups have persisted. Critics argue that communities still living under constant terrorist threats are being asked to accept former fighters without sufficient transparency regarding the screening process, accountability for past crimes, or long-term monitoring after release. Allegations that some rehabilitated fighters have returned intelligence to insurgent networks, though requiring independent verification, underscore legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of reintegration programmes operating without robust judicial oversight and post-release supervision. At the same time, rehabilitation remains an internationally recognised component of counterinsurgency strategy, suggesting that the real policy challenge is not necessarily whether to rehabilitate, but how to ensure that rehabilitation is credible and transparent and does not undermine public confidence or operational security.
The economic dimension of Nigeria’s insecurity is equally alarming. Nigerians paid a minimum of roughly ₦2.23 trillion ($157 million) in ransoms between 2021 and mid-2025, illustrating how kidnapping has evolved into a self-financing criminal economy capable of sustaining insurgent and bandit operations. These ransom payments effectively provide armed groups with resources to procure weapons, recruit fighters, finance logistics and expand their operational reach. In many instances, criminal organisations are generating financial resources that rival, and in some cases exceed, the welfare allocations available to the security agencies pursuing them. This creates an unsustainable asymmetry in which the state is compelled to fight increasingly sophisticated adversaries that are continuously replenished by proceeds from criminal activity.
Against this backdrop, the Federal Government’s decision to raise the minimum monthly salary of soldiers from ₦49,000 ($35) to ₦100,000 ($71) represents a positive acknowledgement of longstanding welfare concerns but falls well short of addressing the realities of modern counterinsurgency. The Defence Minister’s own admission that the increase remains insufficient highlights the structural problem. Soldiers confronting ISWAP fighters, Boko Haram remnants and heavily armed bandit groups are operating in dangerous environments that demand competitive compensation, comprehensive insurance, adequate housing, modern equipment and family welfare support. Poor remuneration has historically weakened morale, encouraged absenteeism from frontline deployments, reduced operational effectiveness and increased vulnerability to corruption or collusion. Improving welfare is therefore not merely a labour issue but an operational necessity that directly influences battlefield performance.
Recent intelligence emerging from Operation HADIN KAI also reinforces that Nigeria’s insurgency is no longer purely domestic. The identification of a suspected Moroccan ISIS operative alongside a Palestinian trainer embedded within ISWAP demonstrates the increasingly transnational character of terrorist organisations operating in the Lake Chad Basin. These developments complement recent counterterrorism operations elsewhere in Africa, including Morocco’s disruption of Islamic State-linked cells, highlighting that extremist organisations increasingly operate through regional recruitment, logistics and knowledge-sharing networks rather than isolated local cells. Foreign specialists contribute medical expertise, tactical training, propaganda production and operational planning, significantly enhancing ISWAP’s capabilities. Consequently, Nigeria’s security strategy must increasingly emphasise cross-border intelligence sharing, financial surveillance and regional military cooperation alongside conventional battlefield operations.
The rescue of abducted students and teachers in Oyo State illustrates another persistent weakness within Nigeria’s security governance: public trust. While the successful recovery of victims is commendable, Governor Seyi Makinde’s call for an independent investigation reflects broader concerns about transparency surrounding high-profile kidnapping cases. His request was framed not as an accusation but as an effort to establish an independent account of events following an unusually prolonged captivity, the execution of teachers, casualties among security personnel and lingering questions regarding possible institutional failures or collusion. Regardless of whether those concerns are ultimately substantiated, governments strengthen public confidence by embracing credible scrutiny rather than dismissing it. Independent reviews of major security operations can help improve institutional learning, identify operational shortcomings and reinforce accountability.
More broadly, Nigeria’s security challenge increasingly appears to be as much a governance challenge as a military one. Security council meetings frequently produce reassurances and policy declarations, yet measurable accountability for deteriorating kidnapping trends, persistent banditry and continued insurgent activity remains limited. Tactical victories on the battlefield are important, but sustainable security also requires institutional reforms that strengthen intelligence coordination, improve prosecution of terrorism-related offences, enhance financial tracking of ransom networks, and ensure clear performance metrics for security leadership. Without visible accountability, operational gains risk being overshadowed by recurring strategic setbacks.
Ultimately, Nigeria’s recent security developments demonstrate that military operations alone cannot defeat an insurgency sustained by sophisticated financing, regional extremist networks and governance weaknesses. The country requires a comprehensive strategy that simultaneously disrupts terrorist financing, strengthens regional intelligence cooperation, improves troop welfare, reforms rehabilitation programmes, enhances transparency in security operations and reinforces institutional accountability. Tactical successes have demonstrated that the armed forces can disrupt terrorist operations. The greater challenge now lies in translating those isolated victories into lasting strategic advantage by ensuring that the institutions responsible for national security are as resilient, coordinated and well-resourced as the adversaries they seek to defeat.