New shores

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger back Morocco's Atlantic access plan after leaving ECOWAS and strengthening Russia ties amid Sahel tensions.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have endorsed Morocco’s initiative to grant them access to the Atlantic Ocean. The foreign ministers of these three West African nations expressed their support during a meeting with Morocco’s King Mohammed VI. This collaboration follows the three nations’ decision to leave ECOWAS and form the Alliance of Sahel States while strengthening ties with Russia. Morocco’s trade initiative aims to provide these landlocked countries access to the Atlantic via Moroccan ports. The meeting also occurred amidst rising tensions between Algeria and the Sahel states, highlighted by a recent incident involving a Malian drone.

The decision by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to endorse Morocco’s proposal for Atlantic port access marks a calculated shift by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to mitigate the economic fallout of their January 2024 exit from ECOWAS. That withdrawal, compounded by ECOWAS’s imposition of a 0.5% tariff on their goods, left these landlocked countries scrambling for alternatives. Morocco’s offer—formalised during talks between King Mohammed VI and AES foreign ministers—presents a potential lifeline, promising to bypass strained regional ties and geographical constraints. Yet the initiative’s viability hinges on navigating fraught geopolitics and overcoming formidable logistical barriers.  

For Rabat, the deal aligns with its long-standing ambition to expand influence in West Africa. Ports like Casablanca, Tanger Med, and Dakhla could serve as vital gateways for AES exports—Niger’s uranium, Mali’s gold, and Burkina Faso’s cotton—while reducing reliance on traditionally dominant ECOWAS hubs such as Abidjan and Dakar. Morocco’s established infrastructure and global trade connections make it a pragmatic partner, offering the AES a pathway to circumvent regional tensions and integrate into broader African and international markets.  

Crucially, the partnership dovetails with the AES’s deepening ties to Russia, which has emerged as a key security and economic ally. Morocco’s pragmatic engagement with Moscow eases potential coordination, creating an informal but potent alignment: the Sahel states provide strategic depth, Morocco supplies trade infrastructure, and Russia offers diplomatic and military backing.  

Yet the initiative faces significant headwinds. Algeria, Morocco’s regional rival and a supporter of the Polisario Front, views Rabat’s Sahel outreach as a direct challenge. The recent drone incident involving Mali and Algerian forces underscores escalating tensions, potentially forcing the AES into a delicate balancing act. Internal instability within the AES—junta rule, coups, and governance deficits—also raises questions about their capacity to uphold complex trade agreements.  

Logistical hurdles loom equally large. The vast distances between Sahelian capitals and Moroccan ports and underdeveloped transport corridors demand substantial investment in roads, rail, and border infrastructure. Without swift improvements, the economic benefits may remain theoretical.  

The Morocco-AES partnership signals a broader reconfiguration of West African geopolitics. By turning toward the Atlantic, the Sahel states are not merely seeking new trade routes—they are challenging the post-colonial regional order, where ECOWAS once reigned supreme. Their pivot weakens the bloc further, accelerating a shift toward alliances defined by pragmatic interests rather than institutional loyalties.  

For Morocco, success would cement its role as a continental trade nexus and counter Algeria’s influence. For the AES, it offers an escape from economic isolation. However, the venture’s durability rests on two precarious pillars: the AES’s ability to stabilise internally and Morocco’s willingness to invest long-term in Sahelian connectivity. The alliance could unravel if either falter, leaving the Sahel more fragmented and Morocco’s ambitions unfulfilled.  

This initiative transcends mere infrastructure; it reflects a strategic recalibration. The emerging Morocco-AES-Russia nexus—though informal—poses a direct challenge to traditional regional architectures, suggesting a future where trade corridors and security partnerships redraw the map of West African influence.  

Yet the greatest test lies in execution. Can Morocco and the AES transform diplomatic overtures into tangible connectivity? Or will geopolitical rivalries and infrastructural gaps render this Atlantic vision another unrealised ambition? The answers will shape not just the Sahel’s economic prospects, but the balance of power across the Maghreb and beyond.