Niger keeps border with Benin shut

Niger’s junta leader insists the border with Benin will stay closed, accusing its neighbour of hosting terrorists and betraying Nigerien aspirations.

Niger’s president, Abdourahamane Tchiani, has said the border with Benin will remain closed until security improves on the Beninese side. Speaking at a rally in Gaya near the frontier, Tchiani accused Benin of hosting French troops and alleged that Western countries were using it to “finance and support terrorism” aimed at destabilising the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Benin has repeatedly denied such claims. Tchiani insisted that reopening the border would “betray the aspirations of the Nigerien people.” The crossing has been shut since July 2023, following the coup that brought Tchiani’s junta to power, severely disrupting trade and movement between the two neighbours. Benin had invited Niger and Burkina Faso, both AES members, to join its national day parade in August as a gesture of goodwill, but both countries declined to send troops.

The resurgence of accusations from Nigerien leader Tchiani against his neighbours is striking, largely because the rhetoric is recycled. It coincides with an acute period of pressure on the Nigerien junta, whose grip on power increasingly relies on framing events as external sabotage rather than delivering tangible improvements in governance or security.

This pattern is evident in the ongoing dispute with Benin. The closure of the border, maintained since the July 2023 coup, is presented by Mr Tchiani as a security doctrine, yet it functions primarily as a domestic political tactic. His current claim that Benin is hosting French forces to “finance and support terrorism” targeting the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) mirrors an unsubstantiated accusation he made roughly a year ago. At that time, he similarly accused Nigeria of hosting French bases. He even claimed, without evidence, that the Lakurawa Islamist group operating in Nigeria was a joint Nigeria–France creation aimed at destabilising Niger. Now, as battlefield losses mount, the junta again reaches for geopolitical scapegoats.

Despite promises of enhanced security and the raising of civilian vigilante groups, Niger’s military has failed to contain the Islamic State Sahel Province, which continues to penetrate deep into Tillaberi, overrunning military posts and exposing the emptiness of the junta’s commitment. This mounting pressure culminated in a domestic disaster in late October: a Nigerien army drone strike on the Tchimbarkawa market, which tragically killed at least 17 civilians. This incident fuelled significant domestic anger, forcing the junta to deflect blame outwards to maintain its position.

The closed border with Benin serves as a convenient pressure valve. By insisting that reopening the border would “betray the aspirations of the Nigerien people,” Tchiani stokes nationalism and shifts public attention away from the growing gap between the junta’s promises and the harsh realities of worsening insurgency and economic fragility.

The tensions with Benin run deeper than Tchiani publicly admits, stretching back to the ECOWAS standoff following the 2023 coup. This led to sanctions that halted the flow of oil through the CNPC-built Agadem–Seme pipeline. While Benin eventually reopened its border for humanitarian reasons and allowed oil transit, Niger refused to reciprocate, citing the presence of French troops and concerns over migrant crossings. This established a cycle of mistrust, which included arrests of Nigerien oil workers, sabotage claims, and failed mediation attempts by former Beninese presidents.

Although Chinese mediation eventually restored oil flows, Niger deliberately kept its land borders closed, instead diverting trade to Togo. This calculated move highlights that the border closure is less about genuine security and more about the political utility of blaming neighbours for internal failings and preserving a besieged regime. The strategy, however, has its limits: the closed border hurts Niger’s economy more than Benin’s and deepens the junta’s dependence on Togo and external actors, such as China. Without a credible security turnaround or a diplomatic reset, the junta is simply buying time by reheating old grievances, delaying accountability that is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid.