Repentant fighters cost more than bullets
Boko Haram kills 43 across Lake Chad region as Nigeria’s costly deradicalisation programme faces criticism over weak oversight.
Boko Haram and its ISWAP faction have intensified attacks across the Lake Chad region, killing at least 20 civilians in northeast Nigeria and 23 Chadian soldiers in a separate assault on a military outpost. Villages in Borno and Adamawa states were raided, with homes burned and supplies looted. The violence underscores persistent insecurity despite years of military operations. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s deradicalisation programme for repentant fighters faces criticism over high costs, weak oversight, and fears of recidivism. Analysts warn that without stronger accountability and community involvement, efforts to balance peacebuilding with justice may further undermine public trust and long-term security.
The recent surge in attacks across Nigeria’s northeast and the wider Lake Chad region suggests that Boko Haram and ISWAP are entering a new and more dangerous phase of insurgency, one defined not only by growing operational sophistication but also by deeper fragmentation, intensified competition for territory, and the persistent failure of state responses to establish lasting security. The killing of at least 23 Chadian soldiers in Barka Tolorom alongside coordinated assaults across Borno and Yobe states highlights how both groups remain capable of launching simultaneous, high-impact operations despite years of regional military campaigns.
What is increasingly evident is that the insurgency is no longer sustained solely by ideology. Control of economic resources has become central to the conflict. ISWAP and the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction are engaged in an escalating struggle for dominance over Lake Chad’s fishing economy, smuggling corridors, taxation routes, and border trade networks linking Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Rather than weakening the insurgents, the rivalry has intensified violence against civilians as communities become trapped between competing armed factions seeking revenue, recruits, and territorial influence.
This shift helps explain the recent rise in attacks on villages and civilian populations. Under mounting military pressure on its island bases, ISWAP appears to be increasingly targeting softer civilian areas to demonstrate resilience, punish communities accused of collaborating with state forces, and generate quick revenue through looting and extortion. Many of the recent raids also bear the hallmarks of JAS operations, particularly the large-scale burning of villages and indiscriminate killings that have historically defined the faction’s tactics. In some cases, there are indications of tactical overlap between both factions despite their internal rivalry, allowing them to temporarily coordinate pressure on the state while continuing their struggle for supremacy elsewhere.
The inability of security forces to contain this evolution reflects deeper structural weaknesses in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency architecture. Military operations continue to achieve tactical victories without translating them into long-term territorial control or civilian protection. Troops remain heavily concentrated in super-camps and urban centres, leaving remote villages and island communities largely exposed. The reliance on static military positions has given insurgents operational flexibility across waterways and difficult terrain, where they can attack and retreat rapidly using boats and local networks.
Compounding the problem is weak intelligence gathering. Fear of retaliation has reduced cooperation from local communities, while rapid-response mechanisms are often too slow to prevent attacks or to pursue fleeing fighters. Across the broader Sahel, worsening instability in Mali and neighbouring states has also emboldened jihadist groups by demonstrating the vulnerabilities of regional militaries despite foreign backing and external military partnerships.
Alongside the battlefield challenges, Nigeria’s deradicalisation and reintegration strategy under Operation Safe Corridor has become one of the most controversial aspects of the country’s counterinsurgency policy. While the programme is intended to encourage defections and weaken insurgent ranks from within, it faces growing public distrust and serious implementation problems. Legal challenges seeking to halt the reintegration of former fighters reflect wider anger among communities that feel justice is being bypassed in favour of political expediency.
The programme’s weaknesses are substantial. The current rehabilitation process is widely seen as too short and insufficiently rigorous, while inadequate vocational training, delayed stipends, poor post-release monitoring, and weak risk assessment systems leave former fighters vulnerable to re-recruitment. Communities often receive little consultation before ex-combatants are returned, undermining social trust and creating fears that infiltrators may exploit the system.
Ultimately, the crisis illustrates the limits of relying primarily on military force or on symbolic rehabilitation programmes without addressing the deeper governance failures that sustain the insurgency. Until Nigeria and its regional partners can combine sustained territorial security, stronger local intelligence networks, economic stabilisation in vulnerable border communities, and credible justice-based reintegration frameworks, Boko Haram and ISWAP will likely continue adapting faster than the state’s response mechanisms.